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ABSTRACT 
 
In contrast to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRComm), the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has not yet found that a prohibition of abortion in cases of fatal fetal 
abnormality (FFA) violates the prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatment (Art 3 ECHR). We argue that the ECtHR is on the verge of aligning itself with 
the HRComm because: (i) recent ECtHR jurisprudence is broadening its interpretation of 
rights within the abortion context; (ii) the ECtHR frequently uses international law as an 
interpretative tool; and (iii) moving in the direction of the HRComm would not be as 
controversial as it may have been in the past. More broadly, we take a positive view of 
fragmentation and demonstrate how an international court, with some ingenuity, can 
broaden its approach on sensitive topics, by engaging with views of other international 
courts or Treaty Monitoring Bodies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) record on access to abortion is largely one 
of avoidance. Rather than bolstering access to reproductive rights, the ECtHR has tended 
to avoid direct encroachment on States’ discretion by finding that the respective cases do 
not meet the Article 3 threshold (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It has also held that 
States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in relation to Article 8 (right to private and 
family life) and has only found violations of Article 8 where abortion was provided for in 
domestic law but not accessible in practice.1 Unsurprisingly, the dominant position in the 
literature is that the ECtHR is not a fruitful avenue to challenge a State’s prohibition of 
abortion.2   
                                                        
1 See, for example, Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR 20 March 2007) and A, B and C v Ireland App No 
25579/05 (ECHR 16 December 2010). 
2 F De Londras, ‘Fatal Fetal Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law, and Mellet v Ireland’ (2016) 24(4) 
Medical Law Review 591; D Fenwick, ‘”Abortion jurisprudence” at Strasbourg: deferential, avoidant and 
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This article rejects this view and argues that Article 3 holds significant potential to 
challenge restrictive abortion regimes. Our analysis seeks to break new ground by 
showing how the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Article 3 is incrementally developing in favour 
of broader access to abortion. In our view, recent cases have paid less heed to whether 
abortion is legally available within States, have focused on the vulnerability and suffering 
of the respective applicant(s), and have taken an approach that aligns with the absolute 
nature of Article 3. The ECtHR has not yet explicitly found a violation of Article 3 in respect 
of a State where abortion is illegal, but we advocate that the time has come for the ECtHR 
to do so. The tipping point for the ECtHR to do so is provided by recent views of the UN 
Human Rights Committee (HRComm)3 in Mellet v Ireland and Whelan v Ireland,4  which 
found that Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)5 (which mirrors Article 3 ECHR) provides for a right to abortion in circumstances 
of fatal fetal abnormality (FFA). We take a positive view of fragmentation and argue that 
the ECtHR should align itself with the views of the HRComm because the views of the 
HRComm appropriately recognise the suffering experienced in such circumstances; 
because they represent an incremental rather than significant departure from the ECtHR’s 
previous jurisprudence; and because the ECtHR regularly relies on sources of 
international law. Although encouraging dialogue between international courts/ Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies (TMBs)6 is not without its shortcomings, we argue that it can lead to 
more rigorous decision-making, it enhances the legitimacy of their decisions, and ‘is the 
essence of the idea (and ideal) of a global ‘community of law.’”7 In making this argument, 
we show how the minimal threshold for Article 3 of the ECHR has the potential to be 
developed over time both in response to internal shifts in thinking within the ECtHR, and 
also in response to external influences such as developing trends in other treaty regimes, 
including the HRComm context. 
 
The arguments made in this piece therefore aim to shift the direction of the ECtHR 
in future cases; and more generally, they have the potential to support the ECtHR’s 
reliance on international law sources. Moreover, although the main contribution of the 
                                                        
normatively neutral?’ (2014) 34(2) Legal Studies 214; D Fenwick, ‘The modern abortion jurisprudence 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12(3-4) Medical Law International 
249.  
3 The HRComm is a quasi-judicial international committee of independent experts that monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR by its States Parties. The HRComm was established by Art 28 of the ICCPR. It 
can receive communications from individuals against States Parties to the First Optional Protocol (pursuant 
to Art 1 of Optional Protocol 1) and the HRComm can forward its ‘views’ to the State Party concerned and 
to the individual. These views are not binding.  However, as the members of the HRComm are experts in 
international law, and as they are interpreting the ICCPR itself, their views are highly persuasive and are 
seen as authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR. Art 38(1)(d) of the Charter of the United Nations and 
Statute of the International Court of Justice 1 UNTS 16 also provides that the views of experts are a 
subsidiary source of international law. 
4 Human Rights Committee, Siobhán Whelan v Ireland, 12 June 2017, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014; 
Human Rights Committee, Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, 9 June 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013. 
5 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171. 
6 The human rights treaty monitoring bodies (TMBs) are committees of independent experts that monitor 
implementation of the core international human rights treaties. There are ten human rights treaty bodies 
which are composed of independent experts of recognized competence in human rights. This article focuses 
on the Human Rights Committee, which monitors the implementation of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 
7 LR Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273, 325-326. 
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paper is to illustrate how international courts and TMBs can and should engage with each 
other within a global human rights system, the paper also maps how Art 3 could be 
interpreted in relation to abortion access generally. Hence, the significance of the 
arguments raised in this piece are heightened by current developments in various 
domestic contexts. On 25 May 2018, the Irish electorate voted to repeal Art 40.3.3 of the 
Irish Constitution (which enshrined protection for the unborn) and to replace it with a 
provision allowing the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) to legislate to provide abortion 
services. At the time of writing, legislation has been put before the Oireachtas and 
abortion services are expected to be available in Ireland in January 2018.8 The UK 
Supreme Court (UKSC) also found in June 2018 that Northern Irish law was incompatible 
with Art. 8 ECHR for failing to provide access to abortion in cases of rape, incest and FFA, 
and needed reconsideration. There were split views on whether this was also in violation 
of Art 3 ECHR, with two members of the court finding it was.  However, the UKSC did not 
make a declaration of incompatibility,9 and so far, there has also been no change of 
Northern Irish law to provide abortion access in such circumstances.10 Furthermore, in 
Poland, attempts to restrict abortion access were abandoned in 2016 following national 
protests.11 These developments demonstrate demands for and moves towards broader 
rights to abortion access in States with the most restrictive abortion regimes in Europe. 
All of these States are all bound by both the ECtHR and ICCPR,12 and have an obligation to 
bring their domestic law in line with both treaties.13 This article illustrates how the 
positions of the ECtHR and ICCPR on abortion rights could be aligned, thus giving 
direction to such States on how to bring their legislation in line with both treaties.  
 
The significance of this alignment extends beyond the matter of abortion and 
Article 3. Abortion access is a controversial issue, involving complex cultural, religious, 
political, and legal arguments. It thus forms an excellent case study to demonstrate how 
an international court, with some ingenuity, can broaden its approach on sensitive topics 
while maintaining State support. We argue that fragmentation in international law can 
have positive effects, and one such benefit is the potential for cross-fertilization of norms, 
where TMBs/international courts cite and/or adopt and/or build on each other’s views.14 
By engaging in cross-fertilization of norms, incremental steps towards new 
                                                        
8 Abortion services should be set up by the new year, Harris says, (Irish Examiner, 27th September, 2018) 
9 This was because because the Court found that the Northern Irish Human Rights 
Commission did not have legal standing to bring the case. 
10 Nonetheless, pressure continues, at the time of writing, Sarah Ewart has sought leave 
to apply for judicial review seeking a declaration of incompatibly of Northern Irish law 
with human rights law for  failing to provide abortion in cases of FFA. See Fresh legal 
challenge against abortion laws in North is mounted (Irish Times, 1st October 2018) 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/fresh-legal-challenge-against-abortion-laws-in-north-
is-mounted-1.3647745 
11 C Davies,  ‘Poland's abortion ban proposal near collapse after mass protests’ (The Guardian,  5 October 
2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/polish-government-performs-u-turn-on-
total-abortion-ban> accessed 27 February 2018.   
12 Not all States Parties to the ICCPR are parties to Optional Protocol 1 of the ICCPR, which recognises the 
competence of the HRComm to receive and consider complaints from individuals. Nonetheless, the 
authority of the HRComm to provide authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR stems from the ICCPR itself, 
to which most states in the world are party.  See, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 991 
UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
13 Art 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
14 AM Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 191. 
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interpretations of rights can be developed at a quicker pace. Such cross-fertilisation of 
norms can complement the enforcement of rights as States may feel more pressure to 
implement a particular judgment/view if it reflects a broader trend in international law.15 
More generally, we argue that fragmentation of international law encourages a more 
rigorous development of rights, as it provides different fora for rights development, and 
by engaging with other TMBs/international courts, actors are exposed to a greater 
diversity of perspectives and insights which help to inform their decision-making. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II demonstrates how, on balance, 
fragmentation is a positive aspect of international law as it provides the opportunity for 
TMBs/international courts to cross-refer to each other’s views/judgments. This process 
can be used to bolster views/judgments of TMBs/international courts and move them 
away from patterns of restraint to more emboldened decisions. Section III then introduces 
the case study of this piece: Article 3 and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on abortion. It aims 
to show the reticence of the ECtHR in early cases to find a violation of Article 3 and how 
the approach of the ECtHR has broadened in the recent cases of R.R. v Poland and P and S 
v Poland.  It argues that these cases carve a path for the ECtHR to take a broader stance in 
future cases concerning abortion rights. Section IV examines the broader approach of the 
HRComm in Mellet and Whelan, and seeks to demonstrate how these views could act as a 
tipping point for the ECtHR to find that Art 3 ECtHR provides for a right to abortion in 
cases of FFA.16 Section V puts forwards multiple arguments for why the ECtHR should 
engage with and adopt the views of the HRComm. The article concludes in Section VI by 
underlining the significance of cross-fertilisation of norms across the ICCPR and ECHR 
regimes, by presenting such cross-fertilisation as an essential element of a global system 
of human rights protection, and by illustrating the importance of these arguments for the 
development of reproductive rights and their potential broader applicability in other 
contexts. 
 
 
2. FRAGMENTATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE NECESSITY OF 
DIALOGUE AND CROSS-FERTILISATION OF NORMS 
Fragmentation refers to the potential for differences in the interpretation of similar legal 
rules across different treaty regimes. It is particularly evident in human rights law, where 
there are multiple different treaties with similarly worded content. For example, the 
ECHR,17 ICCPR,18 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) all prohibit cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.19 They also prohibit discrimination;20 and provide for 
                                                        
15 S Dothan, ‘How International Tribunals Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14(2) Theoretical Inquires in 
Law 455, 471; S Dothan ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12(1) Chicago 
Journal of International Law 115. 
16 Although this paper focuses on abortion and FFA, our arguments are not necessarily limited to that 
context. Rather we argue that the clearest case for a breach of Art 3 can be made in cases of FFA because 
of because of the clear fit of such women with the way vulnerability has been construed by the ECtHR and 
the HRComm to date. 
17 Art 3, European Convention on Human Rights 213 UNTS 221. 
18 Art 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 991 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
19 Art 37 and Art 39, Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC). 
20 Art 14 ECHR; Art 2 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC); Art 26 ICCPR. See also 
Art 2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
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the right to private and family life.21 All of these rights have been relied upon in the 
context of abortion access.22  
 
However, differences may arise in relation to how TMBs/international courts 
interpret these rights for various reasons. First, the interpretative approach of each 
TMB/international court is influenced by the object and purpose of the treaty which it is 
tasked to monitor.23 For example, the purpose of the CRC is to protect the human rights 
of children all over the world and the purpose of the CEDAW is to protect the human rights 
of women all over the world,24 whereas the purpose of the ECHR is to protect the human 
rights of all individuals in Europe.25 Second, the mandate and/or jurisdiction of each 
TMB/international court is likely to differ. For example, the HRComm may give its non-
binding views on a complaint, whereas the ECtHR may issue binding judgments. Third, 
the circumstances which come before the TMB/international court are likely to differ. 
Fourth, a particular TMB/international court may have more developed jurisprudence on 
a particular right or in a particular context simply because more complaints pertaining to 
these rights/ contexts have come before it. Fifth, and relatedly, a TMB/international court 
may have less developed jurisprudence on a particular right/context simply because it 
has not had an opportunity to examine it.    
 
Fragmentation within international law is likely to increase due to its expanding 
list of international treaties, the increasing proliferation of courts and TMBs with 
overlapping Contracting States and/or functions, and the lack of hierarchy between 
TMBs/international courts. Although the increasing rate of fragmentation is widely 
acknowledged, views are divided on its desirability.26 Some authors have praised 
fragmentation’s scope to foster a diversity of voices and its potential to strengthen  
international law through the proliferation of rules and regimes.27 However, more 
frequently, fragmentation is the subject of criticism.28 For example, it is seen as creating 
                                                        
21 Art 8 ECHR, Art 16 CRC, Art 17 ICCPR. 
22 Human Rights Committee, Siobhán Whelan v Ireland, 12 June 2017, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014; 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee, Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, 9 June 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013; Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR 20 March 2007);  A, B and C v Ireland 
App No 25579/05 (ECHR 16 December 2010); R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011); P. 
and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012).  
23 Art 31(1) VCLT states: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’  
24 Preamble, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1249 UNTS 13 
(CEDAW). 
25 Preamble, ECHR. 
26 International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, 13 April 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, para 9. 
27 See generally: J Charney, ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?’ (1998) 
271 Recueil des Cours 101; S Kirchner, ‘Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of 
International Law: A Place for Values in the International Legal System?’ (2004) 5(1) German Law Journal 
47; B Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’ (2004) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 845. For a discussion of the 
influences courts can have on each other see: N Miller, ‘An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of 
“Precedent” Across International Tribunals’ (2002) 15(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 483; E 
Voeten, ‘Borrowing and Non-Borrowing among International Courts’ (2010) 39(2) Journal of Legal Studies, 
547. 
28 A Fischer-Lescano  and G Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25(4) Mich J Int’l L 999; G Hafner, ‘The Risk Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International Law’, in Report of the International Law Commission on its 52nd Session, 
(U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Suppl. 10, 2000) 321, U.N. Doc. No. ILC(LII)/WG/LT/INFORMAL/2.; G Hafner, ‘Pros 
and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International 
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confusion and uncertainty, threatening the unity of international law, and increasing the 
potential for forum shopping.  
In this paper, we use the example of abortion rights in circumstances of FFA to 
demonstrate that despite having shortcomings, fragmentation, on balance, is a useful 
feature of international law. The diversification of voices arising from fragmentation 
provides TMBs/international courts with the opportunity to engage in trans-institutional 
dialogue (where international courts/TMBs engage with either others’ views); and, 
relatedly, to engage in the cross-fertilization of norms. This is beneficial for three reasons. 
First, although the proliferation of views/judgments from many TMBs/international 
courts can lead to confusion because the application of similarly worded rights may differ 
or appear to differ across treaty regimes, this wealth of jurisprudence can also contribute 
to a more rigorous development of rights if TMBs/international courts engage in trans-
institutional dialogue and cross fertilisation of norms. Comparative lawyers have long 
pointed out that looking at the experience of other courts teaches judges something they 
may not have previously known or allows them see an issue in a different light; and, it 
often provides a greater range of experiences and ideas which leads to better, more 
rigorous views/judgments.29 However, insufficient attention has been paid to the extent 
to which similar considerations apply to different TMBs/international courts considering 
issues of international law.  
In addition, although TMBs/international courts are not formally bound by each 
other’s views/judgments, they have a role in furthering the shared objective of rights 
development within a global community.30 This objective is obviously considerably 
furthered if they use the experiences of other TMBs/international courts as a heuristic 
resource in exploring the range of normative issues at stake in relation to a particular 
right.  Accordingly, provided international courts/TMBs make it clear that they perceive 
the views of other bodies as persuasive rather than binding, judicial dialogue and cross-
fertilisation of norms across international rights regimes should be actively encouraged 
because it complements the fact that ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated.’31 As noted by the International Law Commission: 
 all international law exists in a systemic relationship with other law… 
although a tribunal may only have jurisdiction in regard to a particular 
instrument, it must always interpret and apply that instrument in its 
relationship to its normative environment - that is to say ‘other” international 
law.32 
                                                        
Law 849; ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’  Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission: Part 2 (2006) [251] (UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 Part 2); A 
O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (Cambridge University Press 2014) 96. 
29 AM Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts, (2003) 44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 191, 
201; L Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 
Yale Law Journal 273. 
30 L Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273. 
31 AM Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 191. 
32 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’, 13 April 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 [423]  (emphasis in original). 
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This rule finds expression in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT), referred to as the ‘master key’ to the house of international law.33 
It states that treaty interpretation must take account of ‘any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties’. This rule provides an explicit 
doctrinal authority for the cross-fertilisation of norms across systems, and implies that 
divergence across systems should be appropriately justified to ensure the system of 
international human rights protection operates effectively as a whole.34 As set out below, 
Article 31(3)(c) has been explicitly referred to by the ECtHR on numerous occasions to 
justify its reliance on international sources.  
Secondly, cross-fertilization of law across different treaty regimes can lead to a 
system of rights which can be more responsive to societal and/or technological 
developments. It allows rights to develop at a quicker pace, as more than one body can 
consider the application of similarly worded provisions and whether these apply in new 
contexts. It also means that complaints may be considered within different contexts and 
thus may be informed by different viewpoints. For instance, the general application of a 
right may be considered by the HRComm (in relation to the ICCPR) or the ECtHR, but other 
bodies like the Committee on the Rights of the Child or Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women would consider it from the point the of view of children 
and women, respectively. Although this has the potential to lead to conflicting 
views/judgments, in practice, instances of conflict occur relatively rarely.35 Moreover, 
such conflict can be avoided if TMBs/international courts pay attention to and engage 
with what is happening before different fora. In doing so, TMBs/international courts also 
open themselves to perspectives that might not necessarily have come before them 
otherwise. This is because the actors articulating particular perspectives might not 
necessarily have appeared in proceedings before another body, for example, whilst 
gender equality is likely to be raised before CEDAW it is less likely to be raised before the 
CRC in the same way. Thus, a more holistic view of rights, which represents a much 
broader range of perspectives and interests, often emerges as a result of the 
fragmentation of international law.  
 
Third, new interpretations and/or understandings of rights take place on a 
continuum over time.36 Such incremental developments are useful to ensure that 
TMBs/international courts maintain a good relationship with States.37 Fragmentation can 
complement this process of rights development as incremental steps can occur across 
different bodies in a global system, which can then refer to each other.38 Having more than 
one TMB/international court interpreting rights allows bodies to use each other’s 
                                                        
33 Ms. Xue Hanqin during the debates in the ILC on the significance of article 31 (3) (c) in ILC, ‘Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, 13 
April 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 [420]. 
34 L Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273. 
35 M Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights, (Cambridge 
University Press 2010. 
36 AM McMahon, ‘The Morality Provisions in the European Patent System: An Institutional Examination’ 
(PhD Thesis University of Edinburgh), chapter 5. 
37 L Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273, 296. 
38 L Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273, 314-315. 
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interpretations to bolster their own developments. For the reasons outlined below, our 
article argues that using interpretations of other TMBs/international courts is more 
effective in maintaining the reputation of a particular TMB/international court with a 
domestic public than where TMBs/international courts rely solely on incremental 
developments of its own previous views/ judgments. This type of supra-national cross-
referral lends a source of external legitimation.39 Moreover, by referring to similar views 
of another institution, a TMB/international court can justify its views by reference to a 
broader trend.40  
 
Such cross-referencing also helps ground interpretations as mandated by 
international law, and to mitigate what might otherwise be perceived as an illegitimate 
discretionary interpretation.41 In doing so, TMBs/international courts can bolster the 
legitimacy of their views/judgments because the fact that other bodies have made similar 
findings lends credibility to the decision.42 It is also more difficult for a State to ignore the 
views/judgments of a TMB/international court if violations of the State’s obligations have 
been found by more than one TMB/international court. Moreover, it makes it more 
difficult for a State to argue that such decisions are unjustifiable as the TMB/international 
court cannot be presented as an outlier if it has support in its position from other 
TMBs/international courts. In addition, if the State fails to comply in such circumstances, 
the TMBs/international courts can stand together on an interpretation. Hence, it is more 
likely the TMBs’/international courts’ other Contracting States would perceive the State 
as defiant rather than the TMB/international court as acting unjustifiably. This reduces 
the reputational risk for TMBs/international courts in criticising States’ conduct.43 
Moreover, TMBs/international courts often act tactically and take slow incremental steps 
in finding violations of treaties until they feel it has reached a point where States will 
comply.44 However, if other TMBs/international courts have already laid the path for 
them, it is less likely they will be as cautious and rather than tending towards self-
restraint, they may be more emboldened to act. Put simply, this process of incremental 
development and cross-fertilization allows TMBs/international courts to tread a delicate 
balance between, on the one hand, declaring that States have violated international 
human rights law, and on the other hand, ensuring that in doing so they maintain respect 
of States. States alone have the ability to implement the views/judgments of 
TMBs/international courts, and thus their support for these institutions is vital.  
 
As the foregoing analysis has shown, despite fragmentation’s shortcomings, we 
argue on balance that it is a positive feature of the global human rights landscape, as it 
                                                        
39 S Dothan, ‘How International Tribunals Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14(2) Theoretical Inquires in 
Law 455. 
40 L Helfer and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273, 325. 
41 S Dothan, ‘How International Tribunals Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14(2) Theoretical Inquires in 
Law 455, 469; S Dothan ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12(1) Chicago 
Journal of International Law 115. 
42 S Dothan, ‘How International Tribunals Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14(2) Theoretical Inquires in 
Law 455. 
43 S Dothan ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12(1) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 115.  
44 S Dothan ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12(1) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 115; S Dothan, ‘How International Tribunals Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14(2) 
Theoretical Inquires in Law 455. 
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provides an opportunity for TMBs/international courts to draw on the experience of the 
wider community of human rights monitoring and enforcement in working out how to 
deal with controversial issues that come before it. In the remainder of this article, we 
develop this argument by considering its implications for the ECtHR’s approach to access 
to abortion in cases of FFA, looking at how engaging with international TMBs views, and 
specifically, the HRComm, would be useful for the ECtHR in this context.    
 
The development of Art 3 ECHR/Art 7 ICCPR in this context provides an ideal case 
study for exploring these aspects of fragmentation and the need for judicial dialogue for 
five reasons. First, the HRComm and ECtHR positions on these articles provide a useful 
exemplar of fragmentation across regional and international regimes of human rights 
protection. The position of the HRComm represents the general position in international 
law that there is a right to access abortion in cases of FFA.45 However, this has not yet 
been considered by the ECtHR and thus no similar recognition is evident in this context.46 
Second, this area represents a microcosm, with heightened tensions of the type that can 
generally arise within fragmented international legal spaces. Abortion access is a 
controversial issue, involving complex cultural, religious, political, and legal arguments. 
Accordingly, examining this context provides valuable lessons and insights for 
understanding the usefulness of fragmentation and trans-institutional dialogue for rights 
development more generally.  
 
Third, as discussed in section III below, Art 3 ECHR and Art 7 ICCPR are worded in 
an almost identical manner, so one can readily compare interpretations of these from the 
ECtHR and HRComm. Fourth, there is an established body of HRComm views in Mellet and 
Whelan expressly finding violations of Art 7 for denial of abortion in cases of FFA, and 
although no similar factual circumstances have come before the ECtHR, it has decided 
other cases on Art 3 and abortion access. Hence, the interpretative approach of both 
bodies to this issue is ascertainable and can be compared.47 This allows us to track the 
development of these rights within both contexts. It also allows us to examine the 
potential for cross-fertilization should a similar case come before the ECtHR and to 
demonstrate why in our view the ECtHR should follow the approach of the HRComm. 
                                                        
45 C Zampas and JM Gher, ‘Abortion as a Human Right – International and Regional Standards’ (2008) 8(2) 
Human Rights Law Review 249; RJ Cook and BM Dickens, ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ 
(2003) 25(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1. The position of the HRComm reflects the position of the ICESCR.; 
the CRC; and the CEDAW. However, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been 
critical of this position. See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Comments on the Draft 
General Comment No. 36 of the Human Rights Committee on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights’  (2017) [1] <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-
Article6Righttolife.aspx> accessed 27 February 2018.  The Committee stated “Laws which explicitly allow 
for abortion on grounds of impairment violate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Art,. 4,5,8). Even if the condition is considered fatal, there is still a decision made on the basis of 
impairment.”  
46 The case of D v. Ireland, App no 26499/02 (ECHR 27 June 2006) concerned a claim of access to abortion 
in FFA. However, the ECtHR ruled the complaint was inadmissible as the applicant whose pregnancy 
suffered a FFA diagnosis, had not exhausted domestic remedies because she did not seek access to abortion 
in the Irish domestic courts. It held there was an arguable claim for access to abortion in cases of FFA in 
Ireland as the domestic position was unclear. 
47 There are no cases which have been dealt with by both the HRComm and ECtHR in the abortion context. 
Indeed, Art 35(2)(b) ECHR states that: ‘The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under 
Article 34 that …(b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or 
has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains 
no relevant new information.’  
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Fifth, both treaties protect rights that are primarily civil and political in nature, and are 
inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as ideals of peace, freedom, 
and justice.48 This is similar to other human rights regimes, and hence our analysis offers 
generalizable lessons for the development of human rights in other contexts.  
 
3. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO ABORTION IN 
CASES OF FATAL FETAL ABNORMALITY: THE ROLE OF ART 3 
 
This section argues that the ECtHR’s interpretation of Art. 3 in the context of abortion is 
incrementally broadening and illustrates how this area is ripe for cross-fertilisation of 
norms between the ICCPR and ECHR regimes.  
A. The Traditional Approach of the European Court of Human Rights 
As noted, arguments for broadening access to abortion using the ECHR have tended to 
focus on Art 8 (right to private and family life) and have generally been unsuccessful 
because of the ECtHR’s application of the margin of appreciation. This principle was 
expounded in detail in the Handyside case: 
… it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States 
a uniform European conception of morals … By reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are 
in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion 
on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a 
‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them …. Consequently, Article 10 
para. 2 (art 10-2) leaves to the contracting States a margin of appreciation.49 
Although the margin of appreciation is not generally adopted by other international 
courts and monitoring bodies,50 it is entrenched in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.51 Hence an 
examination of its desirability is a fruitless endeavour and, in any case, beyond the scope 
of this article. Indeed, the jurisprudence relating to Art 8 and abortion access has been 
                                                        
48 Preambles to the ECHR and ICCPR. 
49 Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976) [48]. See also H Yourow, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Springer 
Netherlands 1996) 13. See also, JG Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of 
Human Rights (2nd Ed, Manchester University Press 1995) chapter 7; Janneke Gerards, ‘Margin of 
Appreciation and Incrementalism in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2018) 18(3) 
Human Rights Law Review 495. 
50 The Human Rights Committee has expressly rejected the margin of appreciation. See UN Human Rights 
Committee ‘General comment no. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of opinion and expression’ (12 September 2011) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [36]. At least one decision from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and two advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have made express reference to 
the ‘margin of discretion.’ See Inter-American Court of Human Rights Rios Montt v. Guatemala (1993) Case 
10.804, Report No. 30/93, OEA/Ser.L/V.85, doc. 9 rev.; Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization 
Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Series A No 4 (19 January 1984) [58, 62 and 63] and Rights and guarantees of children in the context of 
migration and/or in need of international protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series A No.21 (August 19, 2014) [39].  
51 Early case law of relevance includes: Lawless v Ireland (1961) 1 EHRR 15; Denmark v. Greece App no. 
3321/67, Norway v. Greece App no. 3322/67, Sweden v. Greece App no. 3323/67, Netherlands v. Greece App 
no. 3344/67 (the ‘Greek’ case) (Commission Decision, 18 November, 1969); Klass and Others v Germany App 
no 5029/71 (ECHR, 6 September 1978); Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978) 3 EHRR 218.  
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extensively discussed elsewhere and we do not intend to reopen such arguments here.52 
Suffice it to say that at present, the only circumstances where the ECtHR will find a 
violation of Art 8 is where abortion is provided for in domestic law but inaccessible in 
practice.53 Art 8 as currently applied is a futile avenue for applicants unless abortion 
access is already provided for in the domestic framework. 
B. Towards a Broader Interpretation of Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 
 
Unlike Art 8, Art 3 ECHR protects an absolute right.54 It must be upheld even ‘in times of 
war or other public emergency threatening the life of a nation’.55 No margin of 
appreciation applies, and States cannot justify any limitations or restrictions of rights 
falling under this Article. Once an act is determined to constitute torture, or inhuman, or 
degrading treatment, States are held to be in violation of the ECHR. In the words of the 
European Commission of Human Rights in Ireland v United Kingdom: 
It follows that the prohibition under Art 3 of the Convention is an absolute one 
and that there can never be under the Convention, or under international law, 
a justification for acts in breach of that provision.56
 
 
The ECtHR has held on numerous occasions that the alleged ill-treatment must 
attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Art 3. The assessment of this 
threshold is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration 
of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and the sex, age and state of health of 
the victim.57 The ECtHR considers treatment to be ‘inhuman’ when it was ‘premeditated, 
[…] applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical 
or mental suffering’.58 Treatment is considered to be ‘degrading” when it humiliates or 
                                                        
52 R Scott. ‘Risks, Reasons and Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion 
Law’ (2016) 24(1) Medical Law Review 1; D Fenwick, ‘“Abortion Jurisprudence” at Strasbourg: Deferential, 
Avoidant and Normatively Neutral?’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 214; D Fenwick, ‘The Modern Abortion 
Jurisprudence under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) 12 Medical Law 
International 249; C Zampas and JM Gher ‘Abortion as a Human Right – International and Regional 
Standards’, (2008) 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 249. 
53 Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR 20 March 2007); R.R. v Poland App no 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 
2011); A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR 16 December 2010) and the more recent case P. and S. 
v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012).  
54 N Mavronicola, ‘Is the Prohibition Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Absolute 
in International Human Rights Law? A Reply to Steven Greer’ (2017) 17(3) Human Rights Law Review 479; 
N Mavronicola, ‘What Is an Absolute Right: Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 723; D Feldman, Civil Liberties 
and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 242; N Mavronicola, 
‘Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal 
Context’ (2015) 15(4) Human Rights Law Review 721. For a contrary opinion, see S Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition 
Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really “Absolute” in International Human Rights 
Law? A Reply to Griffin and Mavronicola’ (2018) 18(2) Human Rights Law Review 297; S Greer, ‘Is the 
Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International 
Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 15(1) Human Rights Law Review 101; S Greer, ‘Should Police Threats to 
Torture Suspects Always be Severely Punished? Reflections on the Gafgen Case’ (2011) 11 Human Rights 
Law Review 67. 
55 Art 15(1) ECHR.  
56 Ireland v. United Kingdom App no 5319/71 (ECHR, 1 January 1978). 
57 Kudła v. Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR, 26 October 2000) [91]. 
58 Kudła v. Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000) [92]. 
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debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human 
dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an 
individual’s moral and physical resistance.59 It may suffice that the victim is humiliated in 
his or her own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others.60  
The ECHR is a ‘living instrument which… must be interpreted in the light of present-
day conditions’61 and this requires the ECtHR to develop its interpretation of the ECHR in 
response to changing societal and technological developments. Over time, the ECtHR has 
developed a broader interpretative approach to Art 3, by developing the right beyond the 
narrow literal interpretation of what was traditionally perceived as falling within the 
scope of Art 3. More recently, the ECtHR has expanded the application of Art 3 to a broad 
range of areas including the detention of persons suffering from acute mental-health 
problems, the suffering of an individual whose deceased relatives’ organs were removed 
without consent,62 any recourse to force by law-enforcement officers that is not strictly 
necessitated by the applicant’s conduct,63 and the forced sterilization of Roma women.64 
Moreover, recent cases such as V v UK have established that ‘the absence of an intent to 
debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out the finding of a violation’ of Article 3.65  A 
similar broadening in the ECtHR’s interpretative approach to Article 3 in the context of 
abortion access in cases of FFA is evident when one examines the case law over time. 
C. Early Article 3 Cases and Access to Abortion: A Narrow Interpretative View 
 
To date, Article 3 has been raised in four cases before the ECtHR concerning access to 
abortion namely: Tysiąc v Poland (2007),66 A, B, C v Ireland (2010)67; R.R. v Poland 
(2011);68 and P and S v Poland (2012).69 In all four cases, the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 8. Article 3 arguments were unsuccessful in the two earlier decisions but violations 
of Article 3 were found in the two more recent cases concerning Poland, where the 
applicants did not have effective access to legally available abortion services. An analysis 
of these cases demonstrates an incremental broadening in the ECtHR’s approach to 
Article 3 in the abortion context. The key factor for the ECtHR in determining violations 
of Article 3 is the vulnerability of the applicant which, as will be seen in section IV below, 
aligns with the way in which Article 7 has been interpreted in the ICCPR context. This 
suggests a convergence in the interpretative approach to these Articles across the ECHR 
                                                        
59 Kudła v. Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR, 26 October 2000) [92]; Pretty v. the United Kingdom App no. 
2346/02  (ECHR, 29 April 2002) [52]. 
60 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 15 March 1978) [32]. 
61 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 15 March 1978) [31]. As cited in: Soering v The 
United Kingdom App no. 14038/88 (ECHR, 7 July 1989) [102]; Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) 
App no 15318/89 (ECHR, 23 March 1995)[71]; Selmouni v. France App no 25803/94 (ECHR July 28, 1999) 
[101].  
62 Elberte v Latvia App no 61243/08 (ECHR, 13 January 2015). 
63 Bouyid v Belgium App no 23380/09 (ECHR, 28 September 2015); El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia App no 393630/09 (ECHR 13 December, 2012). 
64 V.C. v Slovakia App no. 18968/07 (ECHR, 8 November 2011). 
65 V v United Kingdom App no. 24888/94 (ECHR, 16 December 1999); T. v. United Kingdom, App no 
24724/94 (ECHR, 16 December 1999) [71]. 
66 Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR, 20 March 2007). 
67 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010); E Wicks, ‘A, B, C v Ireland: Abortion 
Law under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 11(3) Human Rights Law Review 556. 
68 R.R. v Poland App no 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) 
69 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012). 
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and ICCPR systems.  
 
In both Tysiąc v Poland (2007)70 and A, B, C v Ireland (2010)71 the ECtHR dismissed 
the Article 3 arguments by indicating that the required threshold of Article 3 was not met, 
but there was little real engagement by the ECtHR with the specific facts in each case. 
Tysiąc related to an applicant who was advised that her retina might detach during 
pregnancy.72 Her repeated requests for abortion on medical grounds were denied. After 
the baby was born, the applicant was told that she was at risk of going blind. She was also 
severely disabled and was told that she would need constant care for the rest of her life. 
Her criminal complaint and disciplinary proceedings against the doctors involved failed. 
She argued before the ECtHR that her treatment amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3 as the State failed to make an abortion available in 
circumstances which threatened her health. She was forced to continue a pregnancy 
knowing she would be nearly blind by the time of birth causing her anguish and distress. 
She also argued that the loss of sight on her family and personal life had a devastating 
effect.73  
 
In response, the ECtHR devoted just three sentences by way of reasoning to the 
Article 3 ground. It reiterated ‘its case-law on the notion of ill-treatment and the 
circumstances in which the responsibility of a Contracting State may be engaged, 
including under Article 3 of the Convention by reason of the failure to provide appropriate 
medical treatment’.74 However, it did not delve into these cases, or engage specifically 
with how the facts in the applicant’s case failed to meet the notion of ill-treatment 
constituting a breach of Article 3. The one case cited – İlhan v. Turkey – was seven years 
old and concerned a Kurdish man who was severely beaten by Turkish security forces and 
was then denied access to medical services for a significant period of time.75 This case 
exemplifies the traditional understanding of an Article 3 violation – involving physical 
injuries that were inflicted by State actors and the subsequent failure by the State to 
provide the applicant with appropriate medical care while he was in custody.76 However, 
Article 3 has a far richer jurisprudential history than the ECtHR’s passing reference to 
İlhan implies. Many of the cases described above in section III(B) which expound a broad 
meaning of the term ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ had been decided by the time 
Tysiąc came before the ECtHR. In particular, the ECtHR in Tysiąc should have engaged with 
its case law which found that psychological distress and denial of medical treatment can 
lead to a violation of Article 3.77 It should also have engaged with its then-emerging 
jurisprudence on the relevance of vulnerability in assessing Article 3 claims.78 As will be 
                                                        
70 Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR, 20 March 2007) 
71 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010). 
72 The ECtHR found a violation of Art 8 by the State in failing to comply with its positive obligations to secure 
the applicant respect for her private/family life. 
73 Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR, 20 March 2007) [65]. 
74Tysiąc v Poland App No 5410/03 (ECHR, 20 March 2007) [66].  
75 Ȋhan v Turkey App no. 22277/93 (ECHR 27 June 2000). 
76 A Zureick, ‘(En)gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment’ (2015) 38(1) Fordham International Law Journal 99. 
77 Such as Ireland v. United Kingdom App no 5319/71 (ECHR, 1 January 1978); Aydin v Turkey App no 
2317/94 (ECHR, 25 September 1997); Dȋkme v Turkey App no 20869/92 (ECHR 11 July 2000); Selmouni v. 
France App no 25803/94 (ECHR July 28, 1999); Soering v The United Kingdom App no. 14038/88 (ECHR, 7 
July 1989). 
78 See Chapman v United Kingdom App no 27238/95 (ECHR, 18 January 2001) [96]; Connors v United 
Kingdom App no 66746/01 (ECHR, 27 May 2004) [84]. 
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explained below, this criteria has been subsequently applied by the ECtHR to find a 
violation of Article 3 in cases where abortion is lawfully available but inaccessible in 
practice. Instead, the ECtHR in Tysiąc simply stated that the circumstances did not 
disclose a breach of Article 3 as the minimum threshold for such a finding was not met, 
and stated that the complaint would be more appropriately examined under Article 8 
ECHR. 
 
The brevity of the ECtHR’s discussion and its failure to cite, let alone discuss, the key 
cases that could be applicable is particularly disappointing given the ECtHR’s long-held 
position that: 
 
the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 […] must 
necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of this provision 
and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe.79 
 
We argue that this decision was influenced at least in part by the political sensitivity 
of the rights at hand.80 The ECtHR may have been reluctant to find a violation given it was 
the first case on abortion discussed under Article 3. If the ECtHR found that the threshold 
of Article 3 was met, it would have no choice but to find a violation as Article 3 protects 
an absolute right. This could have been met with backlash from States which the ECtHR 
may have been loath to avoid. Others have argued on a more general level that the notion 
of absolute rights is nebulous because it involves an assessment of subjective factors, 
which allows the ECtHR to use discretion.81 The ECtHR has been accused of (mis)using 
this discretion to avoid finding a violation of Article 3 in other politically sensitive 
contexts, such as cases involving terrorism, deportation, and socio-economic issues.82 In 
Tysiąc, the ECtHR may have also felt that it did not need to engage with the Article 3 
argument as it found a breach under  Article 8 and hence the applicant was able to get 
some relief from the ECtHR.  
 
A similar reticence is evident in terms of Article 3 in A, B and C v Ireland.83 In that 
case, alongside other grounds,84 the three applicants argued that the restrictions on 
                                                        
79 Vilvarajah v the United Kingdom App no 13163/87 (ECHR, 30 October 1991). 
80 On the influence of political considerations and the ECtHR more generally, see D McGoldrick, ‘A Defence 
of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 
65(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 21; M Nicholson ‘(2016) 'Majority rule and human 
rights : identity and non-identity in SAS v France' (2016) 67(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 115.  
81 Although Feldman states that obligations under Article 3 are ‘absolute, non-derogable and unqualified’, 
he remarks that ‘a degree of relativism cannot, in practice, be entirely excluded from the application of the 
notions of inhuman or degrading treatment.’ S Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and 
Wales (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2002) 242 as cited in N Mavronicola, ‘What is an ‘absolute right’? 
Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 
12(4) Human Rights Law Review 723, 728.  
82 F de Londras and K Dzehtsiarou, Great Debates on the European Convention on Human Rights (Palgrave 
2018) chapter 4; H Fenwick, ‘Post 9/11 UK Counter-Terrorism Cases in the European Court of Human 
Rights: A ‘Dialogic’ Approach to Rights’ Protection or Appeasement of National Authorities?’ in FF Davis and 
F De Londras (eds) Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review (Cambridge University Press 2014); 
V Mantouvalou ‘N v UK: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby Needy?’ (2009) 72 (5) Modern Law Review 815; B 
Ní Ghráinne, ‘Challenges in the Relationship between Internally Displaced Persons and International 
Refugee Law’ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford). 
83 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR 16 December 2010). 
84 A violation of Art 8 was found in respect of applicant C, as although abortion was available under Irish 
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accessing an abortion in Ireland breached Article 3. Each of the applicants had travelled 
to the United Kingdom for an abortion: A and B both for health and/or wellbeing reasons, 
whilst C feared the pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. On the Article 3 ground, the 
applicants argued that ‘the criminalisation of abortion was discriminatory (crude 
stereotyping and prejudice against women), caused an affront to women’s dignity and 
stigmatised women, increasing feelings of anxiety’.85 The only options open to women – 
maintaining the pregnancy to term or seeking an abortion abroad –  ‘were degrading and 
a deliberate affront to their dignity’.86 Although it acknowledged that travelling abroad 
for the purpose of an abortion was physically and psychologically arduous for all three 
applicants,87 and financially burdensome for the first applicant,88 the ECtHR stated that 
the applicants’ circumstances did not meet the level of severity falling within the scope of  
Article 3.89 Again, the ECtHR offered no real engagement with the applicants’ 
circumstances or any explanation of why these did not meet the Article 3 threshold. 
 
It is particularly worrisome that the ECtHR did not engage with the facts in C’s case, 
in which it accepted there was a risk to life. C had undergone three years of chemotherapy 
for a rare form of cancer. Her doctor advised her that it was not possible to predict the 
effect of pregnancy on her cancer and that it would be dangerous for the fetus if she were 
to have chemotherapy during the first trimester. When she discovered she was pregnant, 
she received insufficient information from medical professionals as to the impact of the 
pregnancy on her health and life and the impact of her prior tests for cancer on the fetus. 
Given the uncertainty about the risks involved, C travelled to the United Kingdom for an 
abortion. She maintained that she wanted a medical abortion (drug-induced miscarriage) 
as her pregnancy was at an early stage. However, she could not find a clinic that would 
provide this treatment, as she was not a resident of the United Kingdom. She had to wait 
a further eight weeks until a surgical abortion was possible. On returning to Ireland after 
the abortion, C suffered complications due to an incomplete abortion, including prolonged 
bleeding and infection.  
 
The evidence in the case demonstrated that C’s circumstances involved physical and 
mental suffering. As it had done in many previous cases,90 the ECtHR accepted that these 
factors were relevant in assessing Article 3 violations. However, like Tysiąc, the ECtHR did 
not engage with the facts at hand and did not give specific reasons as to why the Article 3 
threshold was not met. For the same reasons we set out in respect of Tysiąc, above, A, B, 
and C was arguably also motivated, at least in part, by considerations flowing from the 
sensitive nature of abortion rights. Moreover, the ECtHR may have been particularly 
reticent to find a violation in this case because at that time, Ireland’s framework on 
abortion was one of the most restrictive in Europe and the previous domestic and 
international case law concerning abortion rights in Ireland had sparked significant 
                                                        
law when a woman’s life was at risk, the avenues for ascertaining entitlement were not clear. 
85 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010) [162]. 
86 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010) [162]. 
87 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010) [124-127]. 
88 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010) [128] and [163]. 
89 A, B and C v Ireland App No 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010) [165]. 
90 For example, Kudła v. Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR, 26 October 2000) [91]; Ireland v. United Kingdom 
App no 5319/71 (ECHR, 1 January 1978) [162]; Denmark v. Greece App no. 3321/67, Norway v. Greece App 
no. 3322/67, Sweden v. Greece App no. 3323/67, Netherlands v. Greece App no. 3344/67 (the ‘Greek’ case) 
(Commission Decision, 18 November, 1969) 
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controversy.91 Nonetheless, as a matter of strict interpretation of law, given that  Article 
3 contains an absolute right, such considerations should not have formed a part of the 
ECtHR’s assessment under this provision.  
 
Despite A, B, and C’s lack of reasoning on Article 3, two final points can be gleaned 
from the judgment as a whole which are relevant for the purposes of this study. First, the 
act of having to travel abroad to avail of an abortion does not, in itself, constitute a breach 
of the ECHR. Rather it is one factor to be taken into account in conjunction with the 
broader circumstances at hand. Second, the ECtHR did not rule out that the threshold of 
Article 3 could be established in future cases in which abortion was denied.  
 
D. Recent Article 3 Cases and Access to Abortion - A Broader Interpretative 
View? 
 
This was precisely what happened in the more recent decisions of R. R. v Poland,92 and P. 
and S. v Poland.93 In both cases the ECtHR found a breach of Article 3. These cases 
demonstrate that the ECtHR’s Article 3 analysis is unconcerned with whether abortion is 
lawfully accessibly in the State. Rather, the ECtHR focuses on the vulnerability of the 
applicant and whether she suffered inhuman and/or degrading treatment.  
 
In R. R. v Poland, the applicant had a scan at 18 weeks into the pregnancy which 
indicated that her fetus was likely to be suffering from an abnormality. She was repeatedly 
denied genetic testing to confirm the diagnosis. By the time a diagnosis of fetal 
abnormality was confirmed, it was too late to obtain a legal abortion. She subsequently 
gave birth to a baby girl with Turner syndrome.94 The applicant claimed she was 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3. She claimed that she was 
treated in a dismissive, contemptuous manner by doctors who criticised her for 
requesting prenatal tests and for considering an abortion.95 She argued this was an 
intentional denial of care to prevent her from having an abortion. 
 
P. and S. v Poland concerned a minor (the first applicant), who became pregnant as 
a result of rape.96 She and her mother, (the second applicant), agreed that she should have 
an abortion, which is lawful in Poland if the pregnancy results from rape. However, the 
applicants’ numerous attempts to obtain an abortion were denied. The mother was told 
                                                        
91 Attorney General v X [1992] IESC 1, [1992] 1 IR 1; Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children Ireland Ltd. v Grogan [1991] ECR 4685; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland App no 
14234/88 (ECHR, 29 October 1992); F De Londras and M Enright, Repealing the 8th: Reforming Irish 
Abortion Law (Bristol Policy Press 2018); F De Londras, ‘Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale 
from Ireland’ (2015) 22(2) Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 234. 
92 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011). 
93 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012). The ECtHR also found a breach of Art 8  in 
this case.  
94 Turner syndrome is a genetic disorder that affects about 1 in every 2,000 baby girls. A girl with Turner 
syndrome only has one normal X sex chromosome, rather than the usual two XX sex chromosomes. Females 
with Turner syndrome often have a wide range of symptoms and some distinctive characteristics such as 
shortness and underdeveloped ovaries. See NHS, ‘Turner Syndrome’, 
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/turner-syndrome/ accessed 22 February 2018. 
95 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [145].  
96 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012).  
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by doctors that she should ‘get her daughter married’,97 and was called a ‘bad mother’.98 
The hospital issued a press release informing journalists of the case and it became 
national news; the first applicant was visited by a priest and an anti-abortion activist 
while in hospital; and she also received text messages from anti-abortion activists to 
persuade her not to have an abortion.99 Subsequently, the first applicant was placed in a 
juvenile centre, but on appeal she was released back to her mother. Eventually, the second 
applicant contacted the Ministry for Health who arranged for the applicants to be driven 
in secrecy to Gdańsk, 500 kilometres away from their home, where the first applicant had 
an abortion in a public hospital. The applicants felt that this abortion was done in a 
‘clandestine manner despite the abortion being lawful’.100 When the applicants arrived 
home, they discovered that information about their journey had been disseminated on the 
internet by the Catholic Information Agency. 
 
In both R. R. v Poland and P. and S. v Poland the ECtHR offered a much deeper 
analysis of the applicants’ circumstances than offered in the earlier decisions of A., B. and 
C. v Ireland and Tysiąc v Poland, elucidating what is necessary to establish a violation of 
Article 3 where there is ineffective access to abortion.  
 
In both R. R. v Poland and P. and S. v Poland, the ECtHR drew on its long line of 
jurisprudence as outlined in section III (B) above. It referred to, inter alia, the relevance 
of physical and mental effects;101 the sex, age, and state of health of the victim;102 the 
length of suffering; and feelings of fear, anguish, and inferiority capable of humiliating or 
debasing the victim.103 Moreover, and of relevance in the abortion context, the ECtHR 
expressly confirmed that acts and omissions in the field of healthcare policy could in 
certain circumstances engage State responsibility under Article 3 ‘by reason of their 
failure to provide appropriate medical treatment.’104 
 
The ECtHR’s consideration of the specific circumstances of each case merits 
further analysis. In R. R. v Poland the ECtHR highlighted that despite having a scan 
confirming the likelihood of an abnormality, the process for accessing genetic testing was 
‘marred by procrastination, confusion and lack of proper counselling and information’.105 
By the time she received the results, it was too late for her to have an abortion. Doctors 
treated her ‘shabbily’, resulting in her humiliation.106 Consequently, the ECtHR held her 
suffering met the minimum threshold for a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.107  
 
Three points should be flagged at this juncture. First, the ECtHR arguably used the 
                                                        
97 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [13]. 
98 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [20]. 
99 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [17]. 
100 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [41]. 
101 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [158]; R.R. v Poland App no 27617/04 
(ECHR, 26 May 2011) [149]. 
102 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [90]; R. R. v Poland App no 27617/04 
(ECHR, 26 May 2011) [148]. 
103 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [92]; R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 
(ECHR, 26 May 2011) [159].  
104 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [152] P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 
30 October 2012); VC v Slovakia, App no 18968/07 (ECHR, 8 November 2011) [106-120]. 
105 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [153]. 
106 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [160]. 
107 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [161], [162]. 
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threshold test in A, B, C as a smokescreen to tactically avoid finding a violation of Article 
3 because it would, in effect, be declaring Ireland’s abortion legislation incompatible with 
the ECHR. The ECtHR may have perceived it politically less risky to find a violation of 
Article 3 in R R v Poland and P and S v Poland given that abortion was legally available in 
Poland but inaccessible in practice. However, the fact that the ECtHR did not focus on the 
legality of abortion within Poland in these cases is important as it leaves the door open 
for the ECtHR to incrementally broaden its position on abortion rights in future case law. 
This approach is desirable as Article 3 is absolute in nature and violations of Article 3 
cannot be justified by reference to domestic law.  
 
Second, the ECtHR described R. R.’s suffering as ‘aggravated’ by the fact that she 
was legally entitled to such diagnostic tests as a matter of domestic law in the State.108 
This indicates that the legality of the testing was not the sole or necessary factor for 
proving a violation of Article 3.  
 
Third, the crucial factor in the ECtHR’s reasoning in both cases was that the 
applicants were in situations of great vulnerability.109 This aligns with the views of the 
HRComm in both Mellet and Whelan. In RR, the ECtHR noted that the applicant: ‘like any 
other pregnant woman in her situation, was deeply distressed by information that the 
foetus could be affected with some malformation.’110 In P and S, The ECtHR stated the 
‘cardinal importance’ of the fact that the applicant was only 14, her pregnancy was a result 
of rape,111 and she was in a position of ‘great vulnerability’.112 The ECtHR also stated that 
medical and religious authorities ‘not only failed to provide protection to her, having 
regard to her young age and vulnerability, but further compounded the situation’.113 The 
ECtHR was struck by the fact the authorities instituted a criminal investigation against the 
first applicant on charges of unlawful intercourse when she should have been considered 
a victim of sexual abuse.114 In short, the ECtHR stated that there was no proper regard to 
her ‘vulnerability and young age and her own views and feelings’.115 Thus, in both cases, 
the fact that abortion was legally provided for within Poland was ostensibly not a legal 
precondition for finding a violation of Article 3. We submit that this approach fits 
doctrinally with the absolute nature of Article 3. In fact, we argue that the lack of legally 
available abortion services in cases of FFA strengthens any claim under Article 3. When a 
woman is denied an abortion, her suffering is made no more tolerable to her in the 
knowledge that the denial conformed with domestic law. As argued by the applicant in 
Mellet, the criminalization of abortion stigmatizes a woman’s actions and person, serving 
as a separate source of severe emotional pain.116 This point is expanded upon in section 
IV below. R. R. and P and S are therefore important because by setting to one side the issue 
of whether abortion services are provided for in law, it paves the way for the ECtHR to 
declare in future cases that a prohibition of abortion is incompatible with Article 3 ECHR. 
 
                                                        
108 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [160]. 
109 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [159]. 
110 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [159]. 
111 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [161]. 
112 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [162].  
113 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [164]. 
114 P. and S. v Poland App No 57375/08 (ECHR, 30 October 2012) [165]. 
115 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [166]. 
116 Human Rights Committee, Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, 9 June 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013, [5.4]. 
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E. The Future of Article 3 Claims 
 
The ECtHR has not yet delivered a judgment considering whether denial of abortion in 
circumstances of FFA violates the ECHR.117 However, if such circumstances came before 
the ECtHR (for example, involving states such as Malta, Andorra, or Northern Ireland 
where abortion is not lawfully and/or practically available in circumstances of FFA),118 
we argue that a very strong case could be made that this would constitute a violation of 
Article 3 for three reasons.  
 
First, R. R. v Poland and P. and S. v Poland confirm that omissions on the part of the 
State including non-provision of medical care could constitute violations of Article 3 
dependent on the circumstances arising. Hence, the denial of an abortion falls within the 
range of issues that could be deemed a violation of Article 3. 
 
Second, an applicant could make a strong case that denial of an abortion in cases 
of FFA amounts to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.  All options open to such an applicant – 
terminating the pregnancy illegally, travelling abroad to terminate the pregnancy, or 
carrying a doomed pregnancy to term – would likely result in inhuman or degrading 
treatment and should consequently be recognised as a human rights violation. Procuring 
an illegal abortion (for example, by purchasing pills on the internet) – could expose the 
woman to risks to her life and/or health as it would be carried out without medical 
supervision. She is likely to fear seeking counselling and/or aftercare if there are any 
complications. She would also have to undertake the risks of criminal charges being 
brought against her, and the corresponding lack of information available and stigma 
associated with carrying out an illegal act. The second option – procuring an abortion 
abroad – could result in significant cost and difficulties in securing time off from 
employment and/or caring responsibilities. She would have to undergo an invasive 
medical procedure in a foreign environment, possibly without a support structure; and 
may have to leave the fetus’ remains behind. Similarly, she is likely to suffer the stigma 
associated with the criminalisation of abortion, and the consequent lack of information, 
counselling and/or aftercare. These two options, as well as the third option of carrying a 
doomed pregnancy to term, would likely result in ‘intense physical and mental suffering’ 
and arouse feelings of fear, anguish, inferiority, humiliation and/or debasement.119 It is 
                                                        
117 D v. Ireland, App no 26499/02, June 27 2006 concerned abortion access in cases of FFA, however, the 
complaint was held inadmissible by the ECtHR which found that the applicant had failed to exhaust 
domestic remedies. 
118 World Abortion Laws www.worldabortionlaws.com accessed 22 February 2018.  It should also be noted 
that at present the Republic of Ireland does not allow for abortions in cases of FFA. However, at the time of 
writing (2 October 2018), the Oireachtas is considering the adoption in legislation which would provide for 
abortion in such circumstances.   
119 CEDAW recently criticised Northern Irish abortion law, which does not provide abortion in cases of FFA 
and noted: “the great harm and suffering resulting from the physical and mental anguish of carrying an 
unwanted pregnancy to full term, especially in cases of…severe foetal impairment, particularly FFA. The 
situation gives NI women three deplorable options: (a) undergo a torturous experience of being compelled 
to carry a pregnancy to full term; (b) engage in illegal abortion and risk imprisonment and stigmatisation; 
or, (c) undertake a highly stressful journey outside NI to access a legal abortion. Women are thus torn 
between complying with discriminatory laws that unduly restrict abortion or risk prosecution and 
imprisonment.” Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Woman, ‘Report of the inquiry 
concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ 
CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 (19 July 2017) [81]. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has 
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therefore likely that the denial of an abortion in cases of FFA qualifies as ‘inhuman or 
degrading treatment’ as per the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  
 
Third, the ECtHR has already recognized that denying a woman autonomy over her 
body and reproductive choices can amount to an Article 3 violation. In the context of 
forced sterilization, the ECtHR noted that it ‘was liable to arouse in [the women] feelings 
of fear, anguish and inferiority and to entail lasting suffering’,120
 
and that the doctors’ 
interference with the applicants’ ability to have children deprived them of an important 
life choice, leading to depression, the deterioration of their personal relationships, and 
the loss of status in their communities.121 The personal and social consequences that the 
ECtHR noted in this context, such as depression and social isolation, may also arise in 
situations when women are denied an abortion, especially in contexts where abortion is 
heavily restricted and where attempting to access abortion for any reason is highly 
stigmatized.122  
 
Fourth, the focus on vulnerability in both cases is significant. We argue that the 
decision of R. R. v Poland is generalizable to any pregnant woman whose fetus has a 
malformation or FFA.123 The ECtHR expressly stated that R.R. was in a position of ‘great 
vulnerability’ as ‘like any other pregnant woman in her situation, she was deeply 
distressed by information that the foetus could be affected with some malformation’.124 
The ECtHR also noted that she had to endure ‘weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the 
health of the foetus’.125 As noted, such vulnerability and fear would be exacerbated for a 
pregnant woman with a FFA who wanted an abortion but was prohibited by law.   
 
For these reasons, should a case concerning denial of abortion arise in the 
circumstances of a FFA, the scene is set for the ECtHR to take the final step and explicitly 
find a violation of Article 3 irrespective of whether abortion in such circumstances is 
lawfully available within the respective state. The alternative would be for the ECtHR to 
use the threshold required for Article 3 to avoid deciding on this issue. We argue that 
would be a difficult position for it to maintain, as all recent decisions of the ECtHR indicate 
                                                        
also highlighted that ‘[t]he health and human rights implications of these [restrictive abortion regimes] are 
acute… the feelings of isolation, fear, humiliation and stigmatisation that these laws often produce, can have 
a broad range of physical, psychological, financial and social impacts on women, with implications for their 
health and well-being.” Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Issue Paper: Women’s sexual 
and reproductive health and rights in Europe’ (December, 2017) < https://rm.coe.int/women-s-sexual-
and-reproductive-health-and-rights-in-europe-issue-pape/168076dead> accessed 27 February 2018. In 
relation to Ireland, he noted the ‘severe mental suffering that the denial of abortion services causes to the 
pregnant woman in cases of…fatal foetal abnormality.’ Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of 
the Council of Europe, ‘Report following his visit to Ireland 22-25 November 2016’ (27 March 2017) 
CommDH (2017)8 [91].   
120 NB v. Slovakia App no 29518/10 (ECHR, 12 June 2012) [80]; VC v Slovakia, App no 18968/07 (ECHR, 8 
November 2011) [118]. 
121 VC v Slovakia, App no 18968/07 (ECHR, 8 November 2011) NB v. Slovakia App no 29518/10 (ECHR, 12 
June 2012); IG and others v Slovakia App no 15966/04 (ECHR, 13 November 2012). 
122 A Zureick, ‘(En)gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment’ (2015) 38(1) Fordham International Law Journal 99. 
123 The use of the concept of vulnerability is not without its problems. However, a detailed discussion is 
outside of the scope of this paper. See L Peroni and A Timmer, ‘Vulnerable groups: The promise of an 
emerging concept in European Human Rights Convention Law’ (2013) 11(4) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 1056. 
124 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [159]. 
125 R. R. v Poland App No 27617/04 (ECHR, 26 May 2011) [159]. 
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it is on the cusp of broader recognition in this context. In addition, the right to abortion in 
cases of FFA has been recognised by the HRComm and other international TMBs. To take 
a different view would leave the ECtHR out of sync with the general position in 
international law, and such divergence would also warrant a justification which would be 
difficult to provide given that the ECHR has made it clear that international law should be 
taken into account in interpreting the ECHR. It would also ignore the clear European 
consensus in favour of legalising abortion in circumstances of FFA. The HRComm’s views 
in Mellet and Whelan can provide a vital bridge for the ECtHR to continue broadening its 
jurisprudence, transcend its traditional avoidance strategy,126 and take a firmer stance on 
access to abortion in cases in Article 3 and FFA.  
 
The following two sections directly address these points. Section IV shows what the 
HRComm position as set out in Mellet/Whelan is; and section V puts forward a broader 
normative and legal case for cross-fertilisation in this context.  
 
 
4. ABORTION RIGHTS IN CASES OF FATAL FETAL ABNORMALITY: THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMMITTEE POSITION UNDER ARTICLE 7 ICCPR 
The recent decisions of Mellet v Ireland (June 2016)127 and Whelan v Ireland (June 
2017)128 represent the HRComm’s most forthright decisions concerning access to 
abortion to date. The facts of Mellet were as follows: During her 21st week of pregnancy 
the complainant was informed at the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin that the fetus she was 
carrying would die in utero or shortly after birth. Neither the hospital nor the State 
provided her with any information or assistance to arrange an abortion in another 
jurisdiction. With the help of a family planning organisation, she travelled to Liverpool 
Women’s Hospital, where she gave birth to a stillborn baby girl. Still feeling weak and 
bleeding, she travelled back to Dublin, only 12 hours after the delivery, as she could not 
afford to remain in the UK.129 The complainant did not receive any aftercare at the 
Rotunda Hospital. She suffered from ongoing complicated grief and unresolved trauma 
and said that she would have been able to better accept her loss if she had not had to 
endure the pain and shame of travelling abroad.  
Ms Whelan’s circumstances were strikingly similar to Ms Mellet’s. The fetus she 
was carrying also had a fatal abnormality and she was not provided with information on 
accessing abortion services in the UK. She also faced significant financial and practical 
difficulties in travelling to the UK. She had to leave the fetal remains in the UK which were 
subsequently delivered to her. She did not receive any support upon returning to Ireland 
while suffering from complicated grief and feelings of isolation. In respect of both women, 
                                                        
126 F De Londras and K Dzehtsiarou 'Managing judicial innovation in the European Court of Human Rights' 
(2015) 15(3) Human Rights Law Review 523. 
127 Human Rights Committee, Siobhán Whelan v Ireland, 12 June 2017, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014.  
128 Human Rights Committee, Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, 9 June 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013. 
129 The complainant said that they spent 3,000 EUR in total, including the 2,000 EUR fee they paid for the 
procedure in the UK. 
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the HRComm found that Ireland violated Articles 7,130 17,131 and 26 of the ICCPR.132 Our 
analysis for the purposes of this paper focuses solely on the Article 7 claim.  
In finding a violation of Article 7 in both cases, the HRComm took a similar 
approach to the ECtHR decisions of P. and S. v Poland and R. R. v Poland, by focusing on the 
vulnerability of the pregnant women. In both Mellet and Whelan, the HRComm held that 
the complainants’ physical and mental anguish had been exacerbated by: (i) not being 
able to continue receiving medical care and health insurance coverage for treatment from 
the Irish health care system; (ii) the need to choose between continuing a non-viable 
pregnancy or travelling to another country while carrying a dying fetus, at personal 
expense and separated from family support, and to return while not fully recovered; (iii) 
the shame and stigma associated with the criminalization of abortion of a fatally ill fetus; 
(iv) the fact of having to leave the fetus’ remains behind; and (v) the State’s refusal to 
provide necessary and appropriate post-abortion and bereavement care. The HRComm 
found that many of these experiences could have been avoided if the complainants had 
not been prohibited from terminating their pregnancies in the familiar environment of 
their own State. It considered that the complainants’ suffering was further aggravated by 
the obstacles faced in receiving needed information about appropriate medical options 
from known and trusted medical providers.  
The HRComm found a violation of Article 7, notwithstanding the fact that abortion in 
cases of FFA is not provided for in Irish legislation. This accords with the absolute nature 
of Article 7, and with the rule in Article 26 of the VCLT that domestic laws cannot justify a 
violation of international law. In the following sections, we will advocate that these views 
provide a tipping point for the ECtHR to take a similar stance. 
 
5. THE CASE FOR CROSS FERTLISATION: MELLET AND WHELAN AS A TIPPING 
POINT FOR ACTION? 
 
As aforementioned, although the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on abortion rights has broadened 
in recent years, it has not yet found a violation of Article 3 where abortion is not legally 
provided for in the relevant State.133 This may well be because it is conscious that its 
decisions are directly binding upon States and its existence and power relies on their 
support. However, the views of the HRComm in Mellet and Whelan could provide a vital 
tipping point for the ECtHR to move from its traditional position of self-restraint to 
expressly acknowledge a right to access abortion in cases of FFA. This is because (i) the 
                                                        
130 This article provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation.’ 
131 This article provides that ‘(i) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
(ii)Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ 
132 This article provides that ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.’ 
133 As noted above, the ECtHR was asked to decide on access to abortion in cases of FFA in D v. Ireland, App 
No. 26499/02 (ECHR 28 June 2006). However, it held that the applicant D’s case was inadmissible due to 
failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 
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views in Mellet and Whelan on a violation of Article 7 do not represent a significant 
departure from the ECtHR’s recent case law; and (ii) the ECtHR can use other provisions 
of international law to bolster its decisions, as it has done many times previously. 
 
A step in the direction of Mellet and Whelan would not be as controversial as it 
might seem at first sight. First, in section III above, we identify a trend in the gradual 
broadening of the ECtHR’s Article 3 jurisprudence concerning abortion rights. 
 
Second, the reasoning in Mellet and Whelan is similar to the ECtHR’s reasoning in 
R. R. v Poland and P. and S. v Poland. In all four cases, the domestic legality of abortion was 
not presented by the HRComm/ECtHR as a relevant consideration to finding a violation 
of Article 7 ICCPR/ Article 3 ECHR. Instead, the focus was on the vulnerability of the 
woman in question. Moreover, as discussed in section III, it is highly likely that the mental 
and physical suffering associated with the illegality of abortion services in cases of FFA 
falls within the ECtHR’s definition of cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment as per 
Article 3 ECHR. Thus, the ECtHR would not be departing from its own established case 
law by making such a finding. 
 
Third, the Mellet and Whelan decisions do not explicitly set out a broader right of 
access to abortions and thus are not radically different from the approach of the ECtHR.134 
Although the Mellet and Whelan decisions referred to circumstances which applied to all 
women in Ireland at that time who wished to have an abortion – such as lack of 
information about overseas abortion providers and the expense and isolation of travelling 
for an abortion –  significant emphasis was placed on the fact that these conditions were 
exacerbated by the complainants’ non-viable pregnancies. In his concurring individual 
opinion in Mellet, the late Sir Nigel Rodley added that Ireland’s refusal to allow for 
abortions even for FFA could not be justified as being for the protection of the (potential) 
life of the fetus. He further pointed out that not only had Article 7 been violated 
cumulatively, but it was also violated by the very requirement that a pregnant woman had 
to carry a doomed pregnancy to term.135 The limited nature of the finding as applicable 
only in cases of FFA also makes it less likely to be as controversial as it might have been 
should it have found a right to access abortion in broader circumstances. 
 
Fourth, and relatedly, a movement in the direction of the HRComm would not be 
as politically unpalatable as it might seem as it is no longer the case that restrictive 
abortion regimes can be said to truly represent the ‘profound moral values’136 of the 
populations of the affected States. For example, in the Irish context, in June 2017, 89% of 
the Citizens’ Assembly recommended abortion access be available in cases of fetal 
                                                        
134 That is not to say that Mellet and Whelan could not be used in future to argue for a broader right to 
abortion. According to F De Londras, the decision also at least implies, and the concurring opinions 
establish, that criminalisation of abortion per se is a violation of the ICCPR. See F De Londras, ‘Fatal Fetal 
Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law and Mellet v Ireland’ (2016) 24(4) Medical Law Review 591. 
135 R Cook, ‘Sir Nigel Rodle’s Insights on the Feminist Transformation of the Right of Conscience’, (2018) 
40(2) Human Rights Quarterly 255. 
136 This was the reasoning offered by the ECtHR for non-interference with Ireland’s abortion policy in A, B 
and C v Ireland App no 25579/05 (ECHR 16 December 2010) [226] where it stated that ‘…the Court finds 
that the impugned restrictions in the present case… were based on profound moral values concerning the 
nature of life which were reflected in the stance of the majority of the Irish people against abortion during 
the 1983 referendum and which have not been demonstrated to have changed significantly since then.’ 
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abnormality where the fetus is likely to die either before or shortly after birth.137 This 
corresponds to views in the general population at that time as an Amnesty 
International/Red C poll taken in October 2017 indicated that 81% supported women 
having access to abortion in cases of FFA.138  Indeed, there appears to be a more general 
trend in public opinion towards recognising abortion access in Ireland – as 
aforementioned, 66.4% of the electorate voted to repeal Art 40.3.3 of the Constitution and 
allow the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) to legislate for abortion services in Ireland.139 
 
Fifth, the ECtHR has already warned States that they are outside of the emerging 
consensus on access to abortion, and may thus be preparing the ground to find a violation 
of the ECtHR in a future case concerning strict abortion regimes.140 Indeed, Zurieck has 
argued that the finding of a violation of  Article 3 in R. R. v Poland and P. and S. v Poland 
may have reflected the ECtHR’s frustration with Poland for not changing the domestic 
framework after the decision in Tysiąc v Poland.141 In future cases, the ECtHR could rely 
on the European consensus in favour of abortion access in cases of FFA to find that such 
a right is also provided for under Article 3 ECHR.142  
 
The above arguments are supported by the practical, doctrinal, consideration that 
the ECtHR has repeatedly affirmed that the ECHR should be interpreted light of ‘any 
relevant rules of international law’.143 The views of the HRComm qualify as ‘relevant rules’ 
because (i) the HRComm has been mandated to provide ‘authoritative’144and 
                                                        
137 The Citizens’ Assembly is a body comprising of 99 citizens, which was established by the Irish 
government in 2016 to consider important Irish political issues. One of these issues was Art 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution (the so-called Eighth amendment), which protects the right to life of the unborn. See The 
Citizens’ Assembly, The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution: Final Report (2017), 8. 
138 The Amnesty International/Red C Poll was conducted between 16-20th October 2017 and polled 1,000 
adults in Ireland. The sample size was controlled by age, gender, socio-economic status and region in order 
to ensure a fully representative sample. The poll also indicated that 60% of respondents believed that 
women should have access to abortion on request, either outright or within specific gestational limits. See 
Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International/ Red C Poll Reveals 60% Support Access to Abortion on 
Request’  https://www.amnesty.ie/itstimepoll/ accessed 22 February 2018. 
139  See, Niamh Towey and Dan Griffin, Ireland votes Yes in abortion referendum (Irish Times, 26th May 
2018) available at https://liveblog.irishtimes.com/d1719622b8/Ireland-votes-Yes-in-abortion-
referendum/  
140 E Wickes, ‘International Trends in the Recognition of Abortion Rights’ in CM Buckey, A Donald, and P 
Leach (eds), Towards Convergence in Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems, 
(Brill 2017) 103. 
141 A Zureick, ‘(En)gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment’ (2015) 38(1) Fordham International Law Journal 99.  
142 World Abortion Laws www.worldabortionlaws.com accessed 22 February 2018. 
143 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT; Al-Adsani v United Kingdom App no 35763/97 (ECHR, 21 November 2001) [55]; 
Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECHR, 23 March 1995) [43]; Al Jedda v United Kingdom App no 
27021/08 (ECHR, 7 July 2011) [76]; Bankovic v Belgium App no 52207/99 (ECHR, 12 December 2001)[55-
58]; Golder v. the United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECHR, 21 February 1975) [29]; Johnston and Others v. 
Ireland App no 9697/82 (ECHR, 18 December 1986) [51]; Mamatkulov and Askaraov v Turkey App no 
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‘determinative’145 interpretations of the ICCPR;146 (ii) the views of the HRComm exhibit 
most of the characteristics of a judicial decision, follow a judicial method of operation, and 
are issued in a judicial spirit;147 (iii) members of the HRComm are persons of high moral 
character and recognized competence in the field of human rights,148 rendering their 
views very persuasive. Most, if not all of them, are experts in international law, and thus 
their views are a subsidiary source of international law.149 It is therefore unsurprising 
that the ECtHR has frequently relied upon the views of the HRComm.150 Indeed, the ECtHR 
has also been more receptive to the ICCPR than to any other treaty in its decisions.151 
 
There are a number of criteria which increase the likelihood that the ECtHR will 
take a particular rule of international law into account as an interpretative source. We 
argue that all these criteria are satisfied in respect of the HRComm’s views concerning 
Article 7 ICCPR. First, the ECtHR is more likely to refer to a particular treaty in its 
reasoning if the respective treaty is widely ratified and if the State implicated in a 
particular case is a party to it. All 47 Council of Europe Member States are party to the 
ICCPR, including the United Kingdom, Andorra, Malta and Poland, the CoE states with the 
strictest abortion regimes.152 By becoming a party to the ICCPR, CoE Member States have 
undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the ICCPR.153 Thus, the ICCPR – and indeed, other treaties have equal 
binding force in international law on States as the ECHR does.154 Hence, pragmatically, it 
is easier for States Parties to abide by their international law obligations under the 
separate treaties if the approaches of the ECtHR and HRComm align. 
 
Secondly, the ECtHR has been more willing to refer to the ICCPR/HRComm where 
                                                        
145 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 33, ‘Obligations of States parties under the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 25 June 2009, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/33 
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148 Art 28, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171. 
149 ‘Human Rights Committee: Membership’ 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx accessed 22 February 2018; Article 
38(1)(d), 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
150 Py v France App no 66289/01 (ECHR, 1 November 2005); TH and SH v Finland App No 19823/92 (ECHR, 
9 February 1993); Kurt v Turkey App No 15/1997/799/1002 (ECHR, 25 May 1998); Mamatkulov and 
Abdurasulovic v Turkey  App Nos 46827/99, 46951/99 (ECHR, 6 February 2003); Mamatkulov and Askarov 
v Turkey App Nos 46827/99, 46951/99 (ECHR, 4 February 2005).  
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there is similarity between the content of the specific ICCPR right(s) and ECHR right(s).155 
Both treaties prohibit torture or inhuman, or degrading treatment (Article 7 ICCPR and 
Article 3 ECHR). The ECtHR and the HRComm have both found that because of the right’s 
absolute nature, a State may not seek to justify its conduct with reference to a need to 
balance the rights protected under it with the rights of others.156 Furthermore, the 
wording of Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR is almost identical. More broadly, both the 
ICCPR and ECHR contain civil and political rights, are based on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and share the same fundamental overarching principles.157 
Thirdly, the ECHR has been more willing to refer to the ICCPR/ HRComm where 
the ICCPR provides more extensive protection to the claimant.158 This is satisfied by the 
views of the HRComm on abortion access, which has traditionally been more willing than 
the ECtHR to find a State’s restrictive abortion regime in violation of the ICCPR.159 A 
strong case for cross-fertilisation can be put forward based on the obligations as set out 
below to interpret the ECHR in a way which respects general international law. 
Thus we argue that the ECtHR should align itself with the HRComm’s views in this 
context because (i) the approach of the ECtHR has traditionally been problematic, and the 
HRComm’s approach is preferable, as set out in sections II and III of this paper; (ii) the 
ECtHR’s recent jurisprudence on Article 3 and abortion rights is broadening, as set out in 
section III; (iii) a movement in the direction of the HRComm would not be as politically 
controversial as it might seem, as set out in this section; and (iv) the ECtHR has frequently 
used international law as an interpretative tool, as also set out in this section. 
Moreover, as discussed above, one way for a court to move from a position of self-
restraint to a broader approach, whilst also reducing the risk to its reputation of doing so, 
is by citing other TMBs/international courts who have adopted a similar position. The 
ECtHR could use the HRComm’s view to bolster and legitimate a finding that denial of 
abortion in cases of FFA is a violation of Article 3. Such a decision could be framed by the 
ECtHR as being inspired by the wider international trend in favour of recognising the 
significant impact of a failure to provide abortion access on the human rights of women, 
as represented by the views of the HRComm. In this way, and through cross-fertilisation 
of norms and dialogue between the HRComm and ECtHR systems, a more coherent system 
for the development of the prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in 
the context of access to abortion is possible. We thus strongly advocate that if a similar 
case to Mellet and Whelan were to come before the ECtHR, the ECtHR should be willing to 
draw on the HRComm’s work and find a violation of Article 3 ECHR, regardless of whether 
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abortion is legal in the applicant’s State. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE ECHR AND TOWARDS A GLOBAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF ACCESS TO ABORTION IN CASES OF FATAL FETAL 
ABNORMALITY? 
This article has rejected the dominant view in the literature that the ECtHR is a fruitless 
avenue for challenging States’ restrictive abortion frameworks. We focused on Article 3, 
rather than the oft-discussed Article 8, and argued that Article 3 provides a significant 
avenue by which restrictive abortion frameworks can and should be challenged.  
 
In this article, we sought to demonstrate how Article 3’s strength can be harnessed 
through a process of trans-institutional dialogue between the ECtHR and the HRComm 
whose recent views found that denial of abortion in cases of FFA violates Article 7 ICCPR. 
We aimed to illustrate how ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 3 has recently shifted, setting 
the scene for it to engage with the HRComm. We further argued that the views of the 
HRComm in Mellet and Whelan provide a vital tipping point to move the ECtHR from its 
traditional pattern of self-restraint in abortion cases to recognizing that denial of abortion 
in cases of FFA violates Article 3 ECHR.  
 
The arguments made in this article in respect of FFA may have broader 
applicability in cases where abortion is denied/inaccessible for an individual whose 
pregnancy is the result of rape. The fact that pregnancy is caused by rape is likely to 
exacerbate suffering for women denied an abortion as the pregnancy and the potential 
child remain as a reminder of the rape. This is likely to exacerbate the pregnant person’s 
mental suffering, putting the pregnant person in a vulnerable position.160  
 
If the ECtHR were to adopt our views and acknowledge a violation of Article 3 
where abortion is denied in cases of FFA (and indeed, by analogy, in cases of rape), this 
would be a significant achievement for reproductive rights because the ECtHR is 
perceived to be the most powerful enforcement mechanism of human rights in the world. 
It can order compensation and there is an international legal obligation to execute its 
judgments.161 Although the judgments of the ECtHR are technically binding only on the 
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Contracting State concerned, in effect the jurisprudence has an erga omnes effect. This 
means that all 47 Contracting States are urged to take account of the ECtHR jurisprudence 
and to draw necessary implications with respect to their own laws and practice.162 
Domestic courts are thus far more likely to cite ECtHR judgments than jurisprudence 
relating to other treaties,163 and ECtHR decisions are cited beyond the CoE in both 
domestic and international courts.164 Consequently, ECtHR judgments frequently have 
more of an impact and are more widely publicised than the views of the TMBs, and an 
explicit recognition of abortion rights in cases of FFA would be a significant development 
in this respect.  
 
Moreover, trans-institutional dialogue and cross-fertilisation of norms should be 
encouraged across all TMBs/international courts. Despite the difficulties which can arise 
as a result of fragmentation, it creates useful fora for interaction across 
TMBs/international courts. It can lead to a more rigorous development of rights as 
TMBs/international courts learn from each other and work together to further the shared 
objective of rights development within a global community.165 It can also make law more 
responsive to societal and/or technological developments. In addition, fragmentation 
may complement the process of incremental rights development as incremental steps can 
occur across different bodies in a global system, which can move the law forward more 
quickly if such bodies engage with and refer to each other.166 In the words of the 
International Law Commission: 
 
[A]ll international law exists in systemic relationship with other law […] 
although a tribunal may only have jurisdiction in regard to a particular 
instrument, it must always interpret and apply that instrument to its 
normative environment – that is to say ‘other’ international law.167  
 
We have sought to illustrate how positive aspects of fragmentation within 
international law can complement the process of rights development as it lends more 
voices to the process, and engagement with these voices helps foster a more rigorous 
system of human rights protection. As Forowicz argues: 
 
By linking the case law of both bodies [the ECtHR and HRComm], the inception 
of a concrete dialogue would render the coordination between the institutions 
more viable and strengthen the protection of the rights enshrined in the ECHR 
and ICCPR.168 
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The arguments in favour of cross-fertilization and judicial dialogue could also be 
applied in other contexts. For example, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning 
deportation of failed asylum-seekers could be significantly enhanced by looking at the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). When 
considering whether a deportation from State A to State B would result in violation of 
Article 3, the ECtHR takes into account whether the circumstances in State B are 
attributable to State B.169 This is problematic as an individual may not be able to contest 
deportation where the risk of suffering is attributable to other actors, such as terrorist 
groups, or where the suffering is caused by a natural disaster, famine, or drought. The 
IACHR has taken a different approach in its examination of Article XXVI of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (protection from cruel, infamous, and 
unusual punishment) in the context of deportation decisions. In the case of Mortlock v USA 
it relied heavily on various aspects of the ECHR’s approach to Article 3, but it did not take 
into account whether the circumstances in the receiving State were attributable to that 
State.170 The ECtHR should consider adopting this approach, as it would be more 
compatible with the ECtHR’s general approach to deportation cases (which focuses on the 
actions of State A, the party to the case who makes the decision to deport), and it would 
be more compatible with the absolute nature of Article 3 ECHR.171 The reasons put 
forward in this paper in support of increased cross-fertilization could be similarly relied 
upon by the ECHR to take into account the IACHR’s approach to deportation cases.  
 
In sum, we view fragmentation, on balance, as a positive aspect of international law. 
Increased cross-fertilisation between the ECtHR and the HRComm could lead to dialogue 
rather than monologue, deliberation rather than gap filling, approaching a problem with 
more creativity or greater insight, and could enhance the legitimacy of judgments.172 The 
ECtHR has referred to the ICCPR and the views of the HRComm on numerous occasions 
as a means of interpretation and of harmonising the ECHR with the ICCPR, and we 
strongly advocate that it should continue to do so in the context of abortion rights.  
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